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DEVELOPMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND JURISDICTION IN
THE NICARAGUA CASE*
MICHAEL P. MALLOY**
INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice, principal judicial organ of the
United Nations Organization,1 has been subjected to frequent and in-
tense scrutiny throughout the nearly forty years of its existence.2 In
some instances criticism has stemmed from particular decisions.' Much
of the criticism, however, has been of an institutional or programmatic
orientation." In particular, there has in the past existed a degree of
distrust or skepticism in the Third World as to the effectiveness of the
Court as an institution responsive to the sensitivities and emerging le-
* An early draft of this article was prepared for a meeting of the Association of
Former Professors and Participants of the Institutute of International Public Law and
International Relations, held in Brussels in August 1984. A later draft was used as the
basis for an address to the International Law Society at the Seton Hall University School
of Law. The author is indebted to the School of Law and to Dean Elizabeth F. Defeis for
their encouragement and assistance.
** Of the Advisory Board. Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law. B.A., Georgetown University (1973); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1976);
Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983).
1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92. See also I.C.J. Stat., art. 1, in 15 DOCUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 355 (1945), reprinted in
S. ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61 (1974).
2. See, e.g., J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF A FAILURE (1976); Lillich & White, The Deliberative Process of the International
Court of Justice: A Preliminary Critique and Some Possible Reforms, 70 AM. J. INT'L L.
28 (1976); Gross, Some Observations on the International Court of Justice, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 33 (1962); Doeker, International Politics and the International Court of Jus-
tice, 35 TUL. L. REv. 767 (1961). Certainly one of the leading scholars of the Court's
jurisprudence and procedure is Shabtai Rosenne. See, e.g., S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965) (a two-volume work); S. ROSENNE, PROCE-
DURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. ROSENNE, PROCEDURE].
3. This was the case with the Court's decision in South West Africa, (Ethiopia v. S.
Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.) Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of July 18). See, e.g.,
Friedman, The Jurisprudential Implications of the South West Africa Cases, 6 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1967); Higgins, The International Court and South West Africa, 42
INT'L AFFAIRS 573 (1966). See generally Malloy, Objections to Adjudication in Conten-
tious Cases Before the International Court of Justice, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 262, 319-
23 (1979).
4. See, e.g., J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, supra note 2.
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gal concerns of developing states.5
Even more threatening to the institutional credibility of the Court
is its relatively sparse practice in the thirty-seven years since it re-
ceived its first application initiating a contentious case.' As of July
1983, the Court had had a total of forty-eight contentious cases sub-
mitted to it.7 Two additional cases were added during 1983-1984, s rais-
ing to fifty the total number of contentious cases over the entire tenure
of the Court to date.
Aside from the obvious disinclination of states to avail themselves
of the Court in contentious situations that is reflected in the above
statistics, other indications from the Court's experience raise doubts as
to its credibility or effectiveness in the view of many states. It is a
continuing source of concern that a significant number of states have
repudiated the Court's jurisdiction and authority with respect to dis-
putes to which they stood as apparent respondents. 9 Further, in the
forty-four contentious cases that are no longer pending matters, only
sixteen resulted in judgments on the merits.10 Finally, in absolute
terms, until quite recently, states have evidenced a decreased willing-
5. See, e.g., Ndiaye, Avis de la C.I.J. sur le Sahara Occidental 16 Octobre 1975, 19
REV. SENEGALAISE DE DROIT 31 (1976) (criticizing "Eurocentrism" of the Court); G.E. Do
NASCIMENTO E SILVA, DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (1973) (noting the Court's
"European and biased point of view").
6. See generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1947-48 I.C.J. 15 (Preliminary Objec-
tions Judgment of Mar. 25).
7. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 3-5 (1983). The total includes separate listings for related
cases which were decided in separate but materially identical judgments (e.g., Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Merits Judgment of July 25); Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion (W. Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (Merits Judgment of July 25)). Other situations of
possible double counting would further reduce the real number. See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C.
OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 68 (2d ed. 1981), suggesting that,
for the period 1947-1978, the then total of 44 cases might be counted as only 38.
8. See Frontier Dispute (Mali v. Upper Volta) (special agreement by parties submit-
ting dispute to the Court), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1252 (1983); Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings
filed with the Court April 9, 1984 (1984 General List No. 70) [hereinafter cited as Nica-
ragua Application]. The status of the Frontier Dispute is currently dormant. Conversa-
tion with M. Claude Poux, First Secretary of the Court, Aug. 15, 1984.
9. See generally Malloy, supra note 3. Such was the case most recently in United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment
of May 24). The case was later discontinued, pursuant to an extra-judicial settlement
between the parties. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1981
I.C.J. 45 (Order of May 12).
10. See INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 7, at 68. The remaining 28 cases
included judgments of the Court upholding objections to adjudication on the grounds of,
inter alia, lack of jurisdiction of the Court, failure to exhaust local remedies or considera-
tions of "judicial propriety." See generally Malloy, supra note 3.
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ness to initiate or participate in contentious proceedings before the
Court at all."
Against this empirical background, serious students of the Court's
jurisprudence must consider the range of current issues before it. The
commentary that follows suggests that there is some basis for optimism
with respect to the Court's current stature and future credibility.
There is evidence in the recent experience of the Court and in the cur-
rent issues pending before it that the Court may be regaining a degree
of influence over the development of international law and credibility
as an institutional device for dispute settlement.
Unfortunately, even as the words of the preceding paragraph were
being written, circumstances were beginning to gather into a new crisis
of credibility for the Court. In January 1985, the United States Gov-
ernment, respondent in a contentious proceeding initiated by the Nica-
raguan Government, 2 brashly repudiated the Court's assertion of juris-
diction over it. 3 It is the view of the present writer that this action,
representing as well a repudiation of the United States duties under
the Charter and the Statute of Court, 4 raises anew the longstanding
doubts about the efficacy of the Court's institutional role.
11. Cf. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 70: "There were only six cases
brought before the court between 1972 and 1980 ... [In] five of them ... [the respon-
dent] states . . . refused to appear. The unwillingness of states to resolve their disputes
by referring them to the court has caused concern about its future."
This situation may be changing. In the more recent period (1981-1984) the Court
has received four new disputes. Of these four, only one involved a jurisdictional objection
by the respondent. Further, of the four applicants and four respondents in these recently
filed cases, three applicants and two respondents are developing countries. Finally, of the
four disputes, three involve maritime or territorial boundary disputes, an area of the law
in which the Court has been relatively active and particularly effective and influential.
Id. See generally Malloy, An Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice in Cases Concerning Boundaries, 14 THESAURUS ACROAsluM 276 (1985) (subti-
tled NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES, 10th Sess. (Sept. 1983), Thessaloniki In-
stitute Int'l Pub. L. & Int'l Rel.). The four cases are: (1) Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12)
(filed in 1981 and decided in October 1984 by a chamber of the Court. See I.C.J. Stat.,
arts. 26-27). See generally Urquhart, World Court's Award to Canada of a Sixth of
Georges Bank Upsets New Englanders, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 7, col. 1; (2) Conti-
nental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1983 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Apr. 26) (filed in 1982); (3) Frontier
Dispute (filed in 1983); (4) Nicaragua Application.
12. See Nicaragua Application, supra note 8.
13. See U.S. Withdrawal From the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the Inter-
national Court of Justice, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
Withdrawal].
14. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 6, & art. 59. See also infra text accompanying notes
215-16.
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MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA
Certainly one of the major issues before the Court at this writing
is the dispute that is the subject of Nicaragua's application instituting
proceedings in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case.1" The
factual background of the case itself reflects a critical state of affairs,
involving charges by Nicaragua that the United States has been using
military force against Nicaragua and is intervening in Nicaragua's in-
ternal affairs through sponsorship of insurgent and mercenary attacks
in and against Nicaragua.' 6 The Court's finding of responsibility on the
part of the respondent for such attacks would have obvious and poten-
tially grave consequences for the acceptability and effectiveness of
United States foreign policy with respect to Central America.
At the present stage, however, attention has been focused on two
preliminary problems: (1) the appropriateness of the applicant's re-
quest for the indication of provisional measures,' 7 in effect, preliminary
injunctive relief;' 8 and (2) the existence of a jurisdictional basis for the
Court's consideration of the application. The first issue was decided in
May 1984;' the second issue was decided in November 1984."0 In light
of the United States repudiation of the Court's jurisdiction, the man-
ner in which these two issues have been handled may have a significant
effect upon the Court's future standing and credibility in the interna-
tional community.
15. See Nicaragua Application, supra note 8.
16. For the detailed allegations of Nicaragua concerning United States intervention
and continued sponsorship of attacks against the current Nicaraguan regime, see Covert
Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua Application, supra note 8, Annex A. The
truth of the factual allegations has not yet been determined by the Court. See Military
and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 169, 182 (Provisional
Measures Order of May 10) [hereinafter cited as Nicaragua Order of May 10]. For an
alternative analysis of the facts, with some emphasis upon allegations of Nicaragua's ag-
gression, see id. at 190-93 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
17. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 41; I.C.J. Rules of Court, arts. 73-75, 78 (1978), reprinted in
17 I.L.M. 1286, 1298-99 (1978).
18. To the extent that article 41 of its statute allows the Court only to "indicate"
provisional measures, it may be argued that such "indications" are merely advisory. See
S. ROSENNE, PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 149-50. Cf. United States Diplomatic and Con-
sular Staff in Tehran, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 16 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 15). To the
extent that they are merely hortatory, "indications" clearly are not analogous to prelimi-
nary injunctive relief.
19. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 171.
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 392
(Jurisdiction Judgment of Nov. 26) [hereinafter cited as Judgment of Nov. 26].
[Vol. 6
THE NICARAGUA CASE
A. Request for Provisional Measures
1. Merits of the Request
On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua filed its application instituting pro-
ceedings against the United States; at the same time it filed a request
that the Court indicate provisional measures to remain in effect "while
the Court is seised of the case.""1 Specifically, the applicant requested
an indication from the Court that the respondent "should immediately
cease and desist from providing, directly or indirectly, any support...
to any nation, group, organization, movement or individual engaged or
planning to engage in military or paramilitary activities in or against
Nicaragua . *... ,22 In addition, the Court was asked to indicate that
the respondent should cease and desist from any such activities by any
of its own officials, agents or forces.2 s Finally, the Court was requested
to indicate, more broadly, that respondent should refrain from "any
other use or threat of force in its relations with Nicaragua. "24 This last
request, if granted, might appear to be little more than a declaration of
well accepted principles of contemporary international law governing
the conduct of relations between states.2 5 Yet an indication would lend
credibility to Nicaraguan charges that the United States was in fact
conducting a widespread campaign of insurgence, sabotage and terror-
ism against the Nicaraguan state and people.
Requests for indication of provisional measures are clearly con-
templated by the Court's Statute and Rules.26 Given the procedural
context, it has often been the case in the past that the request might
well be granted prior to a decision of the Court on the question of its
jurisdiction vel non.2 7 Since provisional measures might be imposed
with effect for the pendency of the Court's consideration of the case,
21. Id. at 171. On the concept of "seisen" in contentious cases before the Court, see I.
SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURISDICTION
87-89 (1965).
22. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 171-72.
23. See id. at 172.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
26. See supra note 17. See generally S. ROSENNE, PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 149-57.
27. Such was the situation, for example, in the following cases: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
(U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89, 100 (Interim Protection Order of July 5); Fisheries Juris-
diction (U.K. v. Ice.; W. Ger. v. Ice), 1972 I.C.J. 12, 35, 184, 191 (Interim Protection
Order of Aug. 17); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 135 (Interim Protection
Order of June 22); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1979 I.C.J. 7;
Cf. Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 328, 348 (Interim
Protection Order of July 13) (jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures found); Ae-
gean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Jurisdiction Judgment of
Dec. 19).
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however, as was contemplated in the instant case, the Court's sensitiv-
ity to jurisdictional issues counsels restraint in imposing such mea-
sures. In any situation in which interim relief is sought, a court will be
particularly concerned about the implications of the request before it.2"
Before this Court, the ramifications are heightened by the fact
that it exercises jurisdiction over parties in a contentious case only by
virtue of the consent of those parties in the first place. Not surpris-
ingly, then, the United States response to the applicant's initiation of
proceedings and request for provisional measures was essentially a
challenge to jurisdiction. While the Court might have withdrawn itself
from this dispute by seizing upon jurisdictional or standing considera-
tions,2 9 the Court held these jurisdictional arguments over until a later
time. 0 It appears to have preferred an approach to the problem of pro-
visional measures that was more sympathetic to factual allegations and
less fearful of the possible consequences of uncertain jurisdiction over
the parties.
In reaching the substance of the request, however, the Court did
endorse a prima facie standard on the question of jurisdiction. While it
need not answer the jurisdictional question prior to the request, the
Court was of the view that "it ought not to indicate such measures
unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to
afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded."3 1 Nicaragua relied upon its declaration accepting the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court to establish the consent of the two
28. Thus, in United States federal practice, the enunciated standards for interim in-
junctive relief seek to minimize the possibility that granting the relief before the issues
are developed will markedly prejudice the rights of a party who might later be vindi-
cated. Cf., e.g., Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977);
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 1981).
29. The Court has frequently resorted to withdrawal in troublesome cases. See, e.g.,
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.; Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Judgment of Dec. 20)
(mootness or "judicial propriety"); South West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (jus
standi of applicants, despite previous ruling that jurisdiction of court had been
established).
30. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 187. The memorial and counter-
memorial on the issue of jurisdiction were due June 30, 1984 and August 17, 1984, re-
spectively. Id. at 209. Oral proceedings on the issue began in early October 1984. See
Moore, Nicaraguan Injustice at the World Court, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1984, at 30, col. 3.
The decision on jurisdiction was not reached until November, more than six months
after the indication of provisional measures.
31. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 179. Nevertheless, the Court deter-
mined whether there was a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by a weighted method,
considering the question only so far as "compatible with the requirements of urgency
imposed by a request for the indication of provisional measures." Id.
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parties,3 2 but it appears that the Court shifted the burden of persua-
sion to respondent to demonstrate that Nicaragua's declaration did not
confer jurisdiction."8 In any event, at this stage the issue was not joined
by respondent on the factual allegations made by Nicaragua in support
of its request. 4 If accepted as true, there can be little doubt that these
factual allegations suggested "the urgent need for the requested
measures."
3
In response to the request for provisional measures, the Court
unanimously indicated, pending its final decision, that the United
States should cease and refrain from any action "restricting, blocking
or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular,
the laying of mines."86 It also unanimously directed that neither Nica-
ragua nor the United States should take any action which might "ag-
gravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court, 8s7 or "which
might prejudice the rights of the other party in . . .carrying out" the
Court's ultimate decision.8
By a vote of fourteen to one (the United States judge, Judge
Schwebel, voting against), the Court also indicated that Nicaragua's
right "to sovereignty and political independence . . .should be fully
respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any military
and paramilitary activities which are prohibited by international
law.""9 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Schwebel argued that the em-
phasis in this provision "upon the rights of Nicaragua . .. is unwar-
ranted." ° He claimed that the United States had charged Nicaragua as
well with violations of international law, particularly against neighbor-
32. Id. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 2. Cf. infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
33. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 180 (citing Aerial Incident of
July 27, 1955 (Isr. v. Bulgaria), 1959 I.C.J. 127, 142 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of
May 26); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1961 I.C.J. 17 (Preliminary
Objections Judgment of May 26)): "[H]owever, the Court is not convinced, by the argu-
ments so far addressed to it," that the declaration of Nicaragua, absent a formal instru-
ment of ratification, did not implicate the present Court's jurisdiction.
34. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 181-82. But cf. id. at 191
(Schwebel, J., dissenting) (United States had nevertheless advanced countering factual
allegations).
35. Id. at 182.
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 190 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). Judge Schwebel emphasized that Nicaragua
should also be viewed as subject to an obligation to refrain from intervening in the af-
fairs of neighboring states. Id. See also id. at 189 (Mosler, J., and Jennings, J.,
concurring).
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ing Central American states."'
A noteworthy aspect of Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion is his
argument that "the obligations of a State to the international commu-
nity as a whole"4 to refrain from insurgency may require the conclu-
sion that "[t]he United States has . . . 'a legal interest' in the perform-
ance by Nicaragua of [such] fundamental international obligations."'4 3
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear from Judge Schwebel's opinion
where such a conclusion leads. Could it affirmatively justify the direct
or indirect use of unilateral force to vindicate this "legal interest"?
Surely, this would be an extreme view, one which is not directly ad-
dressed by the dissenting opinion.4 ' The dissenting opinion clearly as-
serts, however, that the conclusion finding such a "legal interest"
would justify the United States in invoking Nicaragua's responsibility:
for the internationally wrongful acts which are at issue in this
case. The United States should be considered justified in doing
so before this Court not because it can speak for Costa Rica,
Honduras and El Salvador but because the alleged violation by
Nicaragua of their security is a violation of the security of the
United States. 45
The relationship between this argument and the United States ar-
guments in opposition to the applicant's request is unclear. The dis-
sent suggests that the United States has standing before the Court to
press the interests of other Central American states, since those inter-
ests are consonant with the United States interests. Yet this was surely
not the position of the United States at this stage of the proceedings,
since it sought to defeat the request by arguing that the absence of
those states would dictate that the request be denied." To suggest that
the United States could vindicate, if not directly represent, the inter-
ests of these states undercuts the United States argument in this
regard.
Despite the Court's ruling on the request for provisional measures,
the critical moment in this case had not yet arrived for the United
41. See id. at 191-93 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 197 (quoting Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(BeIg. v. Spain) Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Judgment of Feb. 5)).
43. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 198 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
44. In fact, however, Judge Schwebel does suggest elsewhere in his dissenting opinion
that, if the United States does appear to be acting as a "guardian" of states in the Cen-
tral American region, this is due to its treaty obligations with respect to collective secur-
ity in the region. See id. at 196. See also Moore, supra note 30.
45. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 198 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 184. See also infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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States. The State Department took the position that the Court's ruling
was "acceptable," since "nothing contained in the measures indicated
by the Court is inconsistent with current United States policy or activ-
ities. '4 7 In the view of the United States, the indicated measure con-
cerning the mining of Nicaraguan harbors was moot, even accepting
the allegations of the application, because the alleged activities had
ceased by March 1984.48
2. Jurisdictional Implications of the Request
The argument suggested by Judge Schwebel4  could resurface
when the Court reaches the merits of the case. However, the Court
would first be required to decide whether it had jurisdiction. At the
provisional measures stage, the Court unanimously rejected the United
States argument that the case be summarily terminated on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 50 but it did schedule written proceedings to be directed
to the jurisdiction issue.51 The United States arguments against provi-
sional measures therefore afforded a preview of the argumentation on
that issue.
The jurisdiction of the Court in contentious cases remains essen-
tially a matter of consent of the parties.2 Nicaragua sought to estab-
lish the consent of the two parties to the case by reference to declara-
tions made by them accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
without special agreement from case to case.5 3 Nicaragua's declara-
tion,5 in summary fashion, accepted unconditionally the compulsory
jurisdiction of the predecessor Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (P.C.I.J.). If still in force upon the establishment of the present
47. Court's Ruling Acceptable State Department Declares, N.Y. Times, May 11,
1984, at A8, col. 1.
48. Id.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
50. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 186.
51. See supra note 30.
52. See Malloy, supra note 3, at 341-42.
53. I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 2, states: "The states parties to the present Statute may
at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the Court in all legal disputes. . . ." Later in its memorial on jurisdiction, Nicaragua
argued that the Court had jurisdiction under the United States-Nicaragua Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, art. XXIV, para. 2, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No.
4024 [hereinafter cited as FCN Treaty]. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 396
para. 8. See also infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
54. Declaration of Nicaragua, Sept. 24, 1929, reprinted in 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 79
(1983).
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Court, it is deemed an acceptance of the jurisdiction of that court.55
The original declaration of the United States56 accepted the jurisdic-
tion of the present Court, but was subject to three conditions.57 By its
own terms, the declaration requires a minimum six-month notice pe-
riod before any United States notice of termination of the declaration
55. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 5, which states:
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between
the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to
run and in accordance with their terms.
Id.
The continuing effectiveness of specific pre-1946 declarations is a question that has
figured in several previous cases before the Court. See, e.g., Aerial Incident, 1959 I.C.J.
127; Temple of Preah Vihear, 1961 i.C.J. 17. See also Caflisch, The Recent Judgment of
the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July
27, 1955, and the Interpretation of Article 36(5) of the Statute of the Court, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 855 (1960); Johnson, The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, 11
INT'L & COm. L.Q. 1183 (1962). Cf. Barcelona Traction, 1964 I.C.J. 6 (Preliminary Ob-
jections Judgment of July 24) (the Court discusses the effect of art. 37 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice on a pre-1946 treaty). See generally Flemming, Case
Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (New Applica-
tion, 1962; Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 306
(1965); Malloy, supra note 3, at 309-16.
56. Declaration of the United States of America, Aug. 26, 1946, reprinted in 1982-
1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 88-89 (1983) [hereinafter cited as United States Declaration].
57. The conditions exclude from the applicability of the declaration the following
three categories:
(a) disputes the solution of which the Parties shall entrust to other tribu-
nals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be con-
cluded in the future; or
(b) disputes in regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United States of
America; or
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all Parties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also Parties to the case before the
Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to
jurisdiction.
Id. See generally Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 24-26 (Preliminary Objec-
tions Judgment of Mar. 21) (discussion of self-judging "domestic jurisdiction" exclusion
in United States Declaration). See also id. at 54 et seq. (Spender, J., concurring); id. at
75-76 (Klaestad, J., dissenting); id. at 96-97, 103-06 (Lauterpacht, J., dissenting). Cf.
Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 601-03, paras. 64-67 (Schwebel, J., dissenting)
(consideration of possible invalidity of 1946 declaration because of reservation (b)). See
generally Crawford, The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of
the International Court, 50 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 63 (1979). The United States would even-
tually rely on the third condition as one argument against jurisdiction. See infra notes
156-64 and accompanying text.
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could become effective."
This state of affairs presents a clear prima facie showing of juris-
diction, at least sufficient to justify the Court's initial consideration of
applicant's request for indication of provisional measures. 9 The
United States, however, raised three basic arguments in opposition
that sought to introduce circumstantial ambiguities contrary to the
prima facie showing.60
The first argument challenged the effectiveness of the Nicaraguan
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the P.C.I.J. and, a fortiori,
that of the present Court. 1 On September 24, 1929, Nicaragua made
its declaration, but no instrument of ratification of the Protocol of Sig-
nature of the P.C.I.J. Statute was deposited with the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League of Nations. 2 There was some evidence that internal
procedures for ratification occurred in Nicaragua 3 but no such instru-
ment was ever received by the Secretariat of the League.
In the absence of ratification of the P.C.I.J. Statute, the question
of the effectiveness of the Nicaraguan declaration accepting compul-
sory jurisdiction under the Statute remained unsettled. If, as a formal
matter, the declaration had not become effective, then there would
have been no Nicaraguan declaration accepting P.C.I.J. jurisdiction
that was "still in force" to be deemed an acceptance of the jurisdiction
of the present Court.6 5 Accordingly, Nicaragua would not be a state
"accepting the same obligation" of compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court as the United States and, by its own terms, the United States
declaration would not establish consent to jurisdiction as between the
58. United States Declaration, supra note 56, at 89.
59. Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60. These arguments would, if accepted, also dictate that the case itself be removed
from the Court's list. See Nicaragua Order of May 10 at 172, 175.
61. Cf., supra note 55.
62. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 176. On the procedure for accepting
the compulsory jurisdiction of the P.C.I.J., at the moment of signing or ratifying the
Statute, and the significance of the subsequent ratification of the Protocol of signature,
see Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 398-400 paras. 14-16.
63. See P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 16, at 331.
64. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 176.
65. Cf. supra note 55. Judge Schwebel noted, however, that the French text of article
36, paragraph 5, speaks not in terms of pre-1946 declarations being "still in force," but
rather, of declarations "for a period which has not yet expired" ("pour une dur~e qui
n'est pas encore expirke"). See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 203
(Schwebel, J., dissenting). Of course, if the P.C.I.J. Statute, because of the absence of a
formality of ratification, did not come into. force with respect to Nicaragua, then the
Nicaraguan declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction was not "still in force" in 1946,
but neither had it "expired" at that time.
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two states.66
On the other hand, opposing these formal considerations was the
fact that Nicaragua had been included in both United States"7 and
United Nations publications6 8 as a state accepting the compulsory ju-
risdiction of the Court. Further, in a previous case decided by the
Court in 1960,68 the applicant Honduras relied, inter alia, on the Nica-
raguan declaration to establish jurisdiction before the Court.7 0
Although the Court acknowledged its power to remove a case from
the general list when the applicant concedes that there is clearly no
present mutual consent of the parties,71 it was not inclined to dismiss a
case summarily on the basis of this formal argument. The Court char-
acterized the effect of the argument as raising a "dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction,"' "7 more suitable for treatment at the pre-
liminary objections stage of the proceedings Thus, going to the sub-
stance of this argument, the Court observed:
the question is thus not whether a jurisdictional instrument ex-
ists, but whether Nicaragua, having deposited a declaration of
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, can claim to be a "State accepting the same
obligation" within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, so as to invoke the United States declaration not-
withstanding the fact that, as it appears, no instrument of rati-
fication by Nicaragua . . .was received by the League of Na-
tions . . . .[W]here the contentions of the parties disclose a
"dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction", . . . [the
matter should be settled] by a judicial decision . . . rendered
66. United States Declaration, supra note 56, at 88.
67. See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND
OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1984, at 125.
68. See UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 8 (9th ed.); 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 79 (1983). But see id. at n.1 ("It does not ap-
pear, however, that the instrument of ratification was ever received by the League of
Nations"). See also Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 176-77.
69. See Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v.
Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Judgment of Nov. 18).
70. See id. at 196-97. It should be noted, however, that Honduras and Nicaragua, the
two parties to the boundary dispute involved in the case, had concluded an agreement in
July 1957 to submit the case to the Court. Id. at 203. See generally Malloy, supra note
11.
71. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 178. Cf. I.C.J. Rules of Court,
arts. 88-89 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1286, (1978).
72. I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 6.
73. See I.C.J. Rules of Court, supra note 71, art. 79, para. 1. See generally, S.
ROSENNE, PROCEDURE, supra note 2, at 156-68.
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after fully hearing the parties .... [T]herefore the Court is
unable to accede to the request of the United States of
America summarily to remove the case from the list .... "
The second argument concerned a new United States declaration,
dated April 6, 1984, which purported to suspend or modify the effect of
the original 1946 declaration."5 The 1946 declaration would "not apply
to disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or re-
lated to events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be set-
tled in such manner as the parties to them may agree."
'
"7
Furthermore, by its own terms, this declaration was to take effect
immediately, "notwithstanding the terms of the [1946] Declaration,"
and was to remain in effect for two years.77 In light of this 1984 decla-
ration, the United States argued that the instant dispute "falls
squarely within the terms of the exclusion [and] for that reason the
1946 declaration is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on the Court to
entertain the present case."
78
In response, Nicaragua emphasized the six-month notice require-
ment in the original 1946 declaration, 7  and argued that the United
States attempt "to modify or suspend"80 the earlier declaration was
invalid for several interrelated reasons. This rationale attempts to
equate such a declaration with a treaty, subject to the same principles
of interpretation. If these principles do apply to modification and ter-
mination of such declarations, then neither can occur "except on those
conditions [expressed in the declaration] or on some other ground rec-
ognized in the law of treaties." 1 Furthermore, any such conditions
"must also be compatible with the Statute of the Court."8 " Hence, ei-
ther the "modification" is invalid (and the 1946 declaration is still in
force), or the 1984 declaration is, in effect, an attempt to terminate the
74. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 178.
75. See id. at 178-79.
76. Letter from United States Secretary of State to United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral, Apr. 6, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984).
77. Id. Presumably, the "notwithstanding" phrase is intended to refer to the six-
month notice requirement for termination that appears in the 1946 declaration. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
78. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 178.
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
80. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 179.
81. Id. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 39, 54, and 57, reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
82. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 179. For a discussion of "compati-
bility" with the Statute of the Court, see Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port.
v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 141-44 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of Nov. 26); id. at
168 (Chagla, J., dissenting).
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former (and, therefore, is not effective for six months).
There are two basic problems of characterization that the Court
would be required to confront in reviewing these arguments. First, is a
declaration like a treaty, at least insofar as applying principles of
treaty interpretation with respect to modification and termination?
8 3
Certainly, no particular formality need be observed in order to create a
treaty-like obligation." Indeed, binding legal obligations may be im-
posed upon a state as a result of its unilateral public statements.8 5 In
light of the Court's own jurisprudence, it is not even certain that Nica-
ragua would be required to demonstrate reliance on the unilateral dec-
laration before the declaration could be said to impose such a binding
obligation on the United States. 6
A second characterization problem concerns the nature of the 1984
declaration itself. Is it in effect a "termination" of the earlier declara-
tion (and thus subject to the six-month notice requirement of the lat-
ter), or is it "merely" a modification of the earlier declaration (and not
subject to any specific regime of notice)? The Court has tended to re-
sist decisions on jurisdiction vel non based on formalistic or linguistic
arguments.8 7 Nevertheless, the United States for its part argued that
the 1984 declaration was not a "termination," but only a "modifica-
tion" or "suspension," which it was entitled to make with respect to its
83. In this regard, consider the Court's remark in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J.
93, 105 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July 22), concerning the nature of Iran's
declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction: "[T]he text of the Iranian Declaration is
not a treaty text resulting from negotiations between two or more States." But cf. id. at
125 (Alvarez, J., dissenting): "[T]he Declaration is a multilateral act of a special charac-
ter; it is the basis of a treaty made by Iran with the States which had already adhered
and with those which would subsequently adhere to the provisions of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court."
84. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 2, para. 1(a).
85. Cf. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 267: "When it is the intention of the State mak-
ing [a unilateral] declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the
declaration."
86. See id.:
[N]othing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of
the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for
the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent
with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronounce-
ment by the State was made.
Id. Cf. Malloy, supra note 3, at 335 n.386.
87. See e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 22-23; South West Africa,
1962 L.C.J. 319, 336 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of Dec. 21); Temple of Preah
Vihear, 1961 I.C.J. at 31-32 (Morelli, J., concurring.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1951 I.C.J.
89.
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earlier declaration at any time before Nicaragua filed its application."s
In the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, the Court would deter-
mine whether the United States characterization of the 1984 declara-
tion was credible or simply disingenuous.8 9
The United States raised a third argument in opposition to the
request, an argument implicating certain institutional considerations.
The United States asserted that granting the request for provisional
measures would, ironically enough, prejudice regional diplomatic nego-
tiations for a resolution of the tensions in the Central American region:
[T]he allegations of the Government of Nicaragua comprise
but one facet of a complex of interrelated political, social, eco-
nomic and security matters that confront the Central American
region. Those matters are the subject of a regional diplomatic
effort, known as the "Contadora Process", 90 which has been en-
88. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 179. In addition, the United
States suggested that, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, it ought to be permit-
ted to rely upon the absence of any notice requirement in the Nicaraguan declaration, in
order to render its own declaration "immediately terminable." Id. See also id. at 206
(Schwebel, J., dissenting). Nicaragua's response to this argument was, in effect, that ter-
mination of its declaration would be subject in any event to any applicable notice re-
quirements derived from the principles of the law of treaties. See id. The Court refused
to make a determination on the merits of the United States argument at this stage in the
proceedings. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 179. It may be signifi-
cant, by way of analogy, that the United States made a similar argument in opposition to
jurisdiction in an earlier case before the Court. See Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 23. There
the reciprocity argument concerned an attempt by the United States to read into the
Swiss declaration a clause from the United States declaration limiting its application to
disputes arising after its effective date. The Court summarily rejected this argument,
stating that the principle of reciprocity could not justify the United States "in relying
upon a restriction which the other Party . . .has not included in its own declaration."
Id.
89. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
90. On the results to date of the so-called Contadora Process, see generally The Con-
tadora Process for Peace in Central America, 24 I.L.M. 182 (1985) (selected United Na-
tions and Contadora Group documents); Kinzer, Nicaraguans Say They Would Sign
Proposed Treaty, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at Al, col. 4. Contrary to the attitude it
expressed in its arguments to the Court, the United States has seemed somewhat resis-
tant to the recent results of the Contadora Process. See, e.g., U.S. Voices Skepticism on
Nicaraguan Move, id. at A21, col. 1; Kinzer, Nicaragua Says U.S. No Longer Backs
Peace Plan, id., Sept. 25, 1984, at A12, col. 3. The setbacks in the process of peaceful
resolution of the differences between the two states by resort to regional negotiations
raise the possibility of exacerbated tensions between them. See, e.g., Taubman, Treaty
Impasse Viewed as Omen of New U.S.-Nicaragua Tensions, id. Oct. 2, 1984, at Al, col.
1; Howe, Nicaraguan, at U.N., Asserts U.S. Plans to Invade His Nation Soon, id. Oct. 3,
1984, at A4, col. 1. In this regard, at the provisional measures stage, the Court noted in
passing the United States assertion that Nicaragua was under an obligation to negotiate
in good faith within the Contadora Process. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note
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dorsed by the Organization of American States, and in which
the Government of Nicaragua participates. This process is
strongly supported by the United States as the most appropri-
ate means of resolving this complex of issues, consistent with
the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, in order to achieve a durable peace in
the region. The concern of the United States is that bilateral
judicial proceedings initiated by Nicaragua would impede this
ongoing multilateral diplomatic process.9 '
In addition, the United States suggested that the other Central
American states whose security was allegedly threatened by Nicara-
guan actions were, in effect, indispensable parties in the present con-
text. Their rights and interests could be affected by any decision of the
Court in the case.92 The dispute was more properly committed to reso-
lution by regional institutions sanctioned by article 52 of the United
Nations Charter.9 3
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court refused to credit this
argument. This result is hardly surprising when one considers that a
similar argument, made by Iran in opposition to an application of the
United States itself in an earlier case,9 4 was strongly rejected by the
Court. There Iran had asserted, in a letter to the Court, that it should
not exercise jurisdiction because the particular dispute brought before
the Court by the United States was merely "a marginal and secondary
aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied sepa-
rately. ' '9 5 The Court rejected this argument, explaining: "no provision
of the Statute or the Rules contemplates that the Court should decline
to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dis-
pute has other aspects, however important."9
16, at 185; see also id. at 189 (Mosler, J. & Jennings, J., concurring), emphasizing that
both parties were under such an obligation. Nevertheless, the United States has since
given indications that it is not pursuing the Contadora process as a means of resolution
of the present dispute. See Taubman, U.S. Says It Has Halted Talks With Nicaragua,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
91. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 183 (quoting Letter of United
States Ambassador, Apr. 13, 1984).
92. Id. at 184. On October 4, 1984, the Court rejected a petition by El Salvador to
intervene on behalf of the respondent in the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings. 1984
I.C.J. 215 (Order of Oct. 4). See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 395, para. 6. See
also World Court Dismisses Petition by El Salvador, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1984, at A3,
col. 4.
93. See Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 184-85.
94. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id. at 19. The United States has since argued that, contrary to the Court's lan-
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In addition, the notion that resolution of the present dispute
should be left to "regional agencies and arrangements for the pacific
settlement of local disputes""s runs counter to the Court's recent juris-
prudence on the pacific settlement of international disputes. Again, the
Iran case raises an interesting parallel. There the Court considered
whether it might be preempted by the active interest and efforts of the
United Nations Security Council, as well as the Secretary-General and
the General Assembly, in resolving the crisis between the United
States and Iran.9s The Court took the very emphatic view that, not
only was it not the intention of the other United Nations principal or-
gans to preclude it from acting,"' but that it was peculiarly the institu-
tional role of the Court to resolve any legal issues before it, whatever
the role undertaken by those other organs in the context of the crisis.
Thus, the Court has stated:
It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue
between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal
questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes
decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the
dispute.'0 0
It is with this background in mind that we may appreciate the
Court's recital of Nicaragua's response to the United States argument,
echoing the Court's language in the Iran case: "the Court is not re-
quired to decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely
because that dispute has other aspects, and . . . the Court should not
decline an essentially judicial task merely because the question before
the Court is intertwined with political questions."10'
B. The Decision on Jurisdiction
The Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction should greatly
advance our understanding of the way the Court views the limits of
guage quoted in the text, "the issues before the Court [in the Iran case] were entirely
distinct from those before the Security Council." United States Dep't of State, Observa-
tions on the International Court of Justice's November 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility in the Case of Nicaragua v. United States of America, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 249, 263 (1985) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Observations].
97. Id. at 185.
98. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 16-22,
paras. 30-41.
99. Id. at 21-22, para. 40.
100. Id. at 22, para. 40.
101. Nicaragua Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 186.
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this judicial task. On balance, although the jurisdictional issues were in
certain respects novel and uncertain, the case for respondent was by no
means a clearly compelling one. 0 2 The decision also gives some indica-
tion of the extent to which the Court intends to strengthen its institu-
tional credibility as a potentially "important, and sometimes decisive,
factor" in the pacific settlement of international disputes. It is particu-
larly unfortunate, therefore, that the response of the United States to
this decision has been a stark repudiation of the Court's institutional
role in this regard.103
1. Optional Clause Basis for Jurisdiction
At the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, the principal argu-
ment of Nicaragua was that both it and the United States had ac-
cepted the Court's jurisdiction under the "Optional Clause" of the
Court's Statute.'0" In order for this argument to stand, it was necessary
for Nicaragua to demonstrate that its 1929 P.C.I.J. declaration could
be deemed an acceptance of the present Court's jurisdiction. 105 For this
to be so, the declaration must have been "still in force" or "not yet
expired" (qui n'est pas encore expire).'
As was clear at the earlier stage of the case, 0 7 the problem for
Nicaragua was that its 1929 declaration was not supported by a formal
instrument of ratification of the Protocol of Signature of the P.C.I.J.
Statute itself.108 The consequence of this fact is that the declaration
itself did not constitute, at the time, a binding acceptance of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the P.C.I.J.10 9 Nicaragua argued that, while the
declaration was not an effective acceptance of P.C.I.J. jurisdiction, it
had not "expired." In its view the language of the present Court's Stat-
ute, requiring that a P.C.I.J. declaration still be "in force" or "not yet
expired," was intended only to exclude declarations that had already
102. Id. at 206 (Schwebel J., dissenting):
In my provisional view ... [the "modification" and the "reciprocity"] juris-
dictional arguments advanced by the United States... are so substantial as to
require the most searching analysis of the Court.
Nevertheless, I have not found it possible to conclude that, .... the jurisdic-
tional provisions invoked by Nicaragua do not, prima facie, afford a basis on
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be found.
103. Cf. infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
104. I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 2. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 398-99.
105. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 5.
106. Cf. supra note 65.
107. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
108. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 499-500, para. 16.
109. See id. at 400-01, para. 18. See also id. at 514, 518 (Ago, J., sep. op.) (declaration
signed, but without protocol ratification, creates no binding obligation).
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expired before the moment of transition occurred between the P.C.I.J.
and its successor.110 In this regard, it stressed in particular the long-
standing practice of publications of the Court and the United Nations
Secretariat to treat its declaration as effective in binding Nicaragua to
the present Court's compulsory jurisdiction."'
In resolving this novel issue, based on the peculiar facts surround-
ing Nicaragua's attempt to ratify the P.C.I.J. Statute, the Court ac-
cepted the import of the Nicaraguan position, though not the specific
terms of its argumentation. Since a declaration under the P.C.I.J. Stat-
ute could have been made upon either signing or ratifying the Statute
itself,' 12 the Court distinguished between the corresponding validity
and effectiveness of such a declaration. The declaration in question
was, in the Court's view, "undoubtedly valid"" s at the moment it was
deposited with the League Secretariat." 4 It was not binding (i.e., effec-
tive), since Nicaragua, having failed as a formal matter to ratify the
P.C.I.J. Statute, was not a party to it."5 Hence, the Court summarized
the legal characteristics of the declaration as follows: "Nicaragua's 1929
Declaration was valid at the moment when Nicaragua became a party
110. Id.
111. Id. at 401-03, paras. 19-22. The United States took the position that such publi-
cations were not authoritative on the legal question of the effect of article 36, para. 5, of
the Court's statute on Nicaragua's declaration. See id. at 403, para. 23. The Court viewed'
this question as argumentatively significant, but not determinative. See id. at 409, para.
37:
The Court has no intention of assigning these publications any role that
would be contrary to their nature but will content itself with noting that they
attest a certain interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5 (whereby that provision
would cover the declaration of Nicaragua), and the rejection of an opposite in-
terpretation (which would refuse to classify Nicaragua among the States covered
by that Article). Admittedly, this testimony concerns only the result and not the
legal reasoning that leads to it.
For a thorough review of the treatment of the status of Nicaragua and its 1929 Declara-
tion in the Court's publications, see id. at 483-89 (Oda, J., sep. op.); see also id. at 527
(Ago, J., sep. op.); id. at 532-546 (Jennings, J., sep. op.); id. at 588-94, paras. 41-52
(Schwebel J., dissenting).
112. See P.C.I.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 2, which states:
The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the
Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol to
which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court...
(emphasis added).
113. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 403-04, para. 25.
114. Cf. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1957 I.C.J. at 146.
115. See Judgment- of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 404, para. 26.
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to the Statute of the new Court; it had retained its potential effect
because Nicaragua, which could have limited the duration of that ef-
fect, had expressly refrained from doing so."
'
"1
How, then, does such a declaration relate to article 36, paragraph
5, of the present Statute?" 7 As the Court correctly notes, 1 8 the pre-
sent case raises almost precisely the reverse situation of that found in
the case of Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 . 1 There the question was
whether article 36, paragraph 5, had any effect on a binding declara-
tion made by Bulgaria under the P.C.I.J. Statute, since Bulgaria was
not an original signatory of the I.C.J. Statute.1 20 The Court concluded
that the period of time between dissolution of the P.C.I.J. and Bulga-
ria's eventual acceptance of the new judicial regime caused a lapse
which destroyed the effectiveness of the declaration.
21
In the present case, the Court insisted that Aerial Incident "fea-
tured quite a different issue1 2 2 and provided no "pointers to precise
conclusions on the limited point now in issue. "123 Surely, this view is
disingenuous.124 It is true that the dissenters in Aerial Incident criti-
cized the judgment at the time as resting on too narrow an interpreta-
tion of article 36, paragraph 5.'1 It was the dissenters' view that the
provision should have been interpreted and applied in such a way as to
foster continuity between the preceding and current judicial regimes. 26
To the contrary, the judgment in Aerial Incident stressed the impor-
tance of continuity of consent by states to these judicial regimes. 27
116. Id. at 404, para. 27.
117. Cf. supra note 55.
118. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 405-406, para. 29.
119. Aerial Incident, 1959 I.C.J. 127. See generally Malloy, supra note 3, at 309-11.
120. Aerial Incident, 1959 I.C.J. at 136.
121. Id. at 138.
122. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 16, para. 29.
123. Id.
124. The Court cites and quotes Aerial Incident decisively in support of the propos-
tion that I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 5, was intended to maintain, as much as possible, the
continuity of the judicial regimes represented by the P.C.I.J. and I.C.J. statutes. See id.
at 18-19, paras. 32-34, (quoting Aerial Incident, 1959 I.C.J. at 145). See also Judgment
of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 20, para. 28 (Schwebel, J., dissenting): "the Aerial Incident
case strikingly and decisively cuts against Nicaragua's thesis." Id.
125. See Aerial Incident 159 I.C.J. at 175 (Lauterpacht, J., Koo, J., & Spender, J.,
joint dissenting op.).
126. See, e.g., id. at 158, in which the dissenters wrote, "[a]lthough the establishment
of the International Court of Justice and the dissolution of the Permanent Court were
two separate acts, they were closely linked by the common intention to ensure, as far as
possible, the continuity of administration of international justice."
127. See, e.g., Aerial Incident, 1959 I.C.J. at 142:
[Wihen, as in the present case, a State has for many years remained a stran-
ger to the [I.C.J.] Statute, to hold that that State has consented to the transfer,
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One might therefore reasonably argue that the significance of Aerial
Incident for the present dispute is its insistence that the transitional
provision of article 36, paragraph 5, can be invoked only if there exists
actual consent to jurisdiction at all relevant times during the transition
from one judicial regime to the other."'8 If this is true, then Nicara-
gua's 1929 declaration might not have survived that moment of
transition.
Nevertheless, in the present case the Court chose to emphasize its
distinction between "valid" and "binding" declarations under P.C.I.J.
practice. The Court did not explain how a valid but non-binding or
non-effective declaration could be "still in force," in the words of the
English language version of its Statute." It did, however, see signifi-
by the fact of its admission to the United Nations, would be to regard its request
for admission as equivalent to an express declaration by that State as provided
for by Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. It would be to disregard both the
latter provision and the principle according to which the jurisdiction of the
Court is conditional upon the consent of the respondent, and to regard as suffi-
cient a consent which is merely presumed.
See also id. at 148 (Badawi, J., concurring); Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 540
(Jennings, J., concurring): In Aerial Incident "the Court denied that there could be any
possibility of Article 36, paragraph 5, creating a new obligation, not existing under the
old Court .... (emphasis in original). Id. Cf. Malloy, supra note 3, at 311 (footnote
omitted): "The decision in Aerial Incident emphasizes the extreme importance of the
principle of consent underlying the Court's jurisidiction, including the Court's 'compul-
sory' jurisdiction." Id.
128. See generally Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 481-83 (Oda, J., sep. op.).
129. Cf. id. at 406-07, para. 31:
It can only be said ... that the English version does not require (any more
than does the French version) that the declarations concerned should have been
made by States parties to the Statute of the Permanent Court and does not
mention the necessity of declarations having any binding character for the [Stat-
ute's transitional] provision to be applicable to them. It is therefore the Court's
opinion that the English version in no way expressly excludes a valid declaration
of unexpired duration . . . and therefore not of a binding character.
This argument seems somewhat questionable. For a treaty to be "in force," for example,
one would expect that it had a binding character as to the parties thereto. See, e.g., id. at
536 (Jennings, J., sep. op.):
[T]he declarations which are by [the transitional] provision to be deemed to
be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the new Court are those "which
are still in force." And since the Nicaraguan declaration was never "in force" in
respect of the old Court, it would seem to follow that it cannot be held to be
"still in force" for the purposes of Article 36, paragraph 5.
See also id. at 570, para. 16 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (" 'in force' means, and equates
with, 'bound' "). Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 24,
para. 2 (failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as
consent to be bound has been established for all the negotiating states). See generally I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608-09 (3rd ed. 1979). Surely then,
a more attractive interpretation of the two versions of the transitional provision is that
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cance for this distinction in the French language version:
In view of the excellent equivalence of the expressions "encore
en vigueur" and "still in force," the deliberate choice [of the
French delegation to the San Francisco Conference] of the ex-
pression "pour une durke qui n'est pas encore expire" seems
to denote an intention to widen the scope of Article 36, para-
graph 5, so as to cover declarations which have not acquired
binding force.130
The Court did acknowledge the need for continuity expressed in
Aerial Incident as a motivation behind article 36, paragraph 5, but it
interpreted this motivation more broadly than had the previous case.
Imputing to the transitional provision a progressive character rather
than the static one endorsed by Aerial Incident, the Court stated: "No
doubt [the] main aim [of the Statute's draftsmen] was to safeguard
[existing, binding] declarations, but the intention to wipe out the pro-
gress evidenced by a declaration such as that of Nicaragua would cer-
tainly not square well with their general concern [with progress to-
wards compulsory jurisdiction]."''
While this normative approach may seem to advance "the cause of
compulsory jurisdiction," ' it does so by detaching that cause from the
principle of actual consent as the basis for jurisdiction before the
Court, "compulsory" or otherwise.'" It cannot be denied that the sta-
"still in force" means "binding," and that a declaration that is not binding cannot have a
remaining "unexpired period" (la duree non expirte) if its period of effectiveness has
never in fact begun.
For a thorough review of the drafting history of article 36, para. 5, see Judgment of
Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 478-81 (Oda, J., sep. op.). See also id. at 537-39 (Jennings, J.,
sep. op.) and 571-76, paras. 18-24 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
130. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 406-07, para. 31. The Court went on to
acknowledge, however, that "[o]ther interpretations of [the French delegation's] proposal
are not excluded." Id. See supra note 129. See also Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20,
at 522-24 (Ago, J., sep. op.).
131. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 407-08, para. 34. But see id. at 481 (Oda,
J., sep. op.):
There is no denying that the founders of the International Court of Justice
in 1945 wanted to carry over to its declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice as compulsory. This is no license, how-
ever, for interpreting Article 36, paragraph 5, as attempting to refer to any dec-
laration which, without being effective, was simply on record at that time as a
historical statement.
See also id. at 524-25 (Ago, J., sep, op.).
132. Id. at 408, para. 35. See also id. at 524-25 (Ago, J., sep. op.).
133. See id. at 42 (Oda, J., sep. op.). The Court should not close its eyes to the prac-
tice and experience over the last forty years in the international community, which has
given a new meaning to the Optional Clause. The basic principle that the jurisdiction of
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tus of Nicaragua's "valid" but non-binding declaration is ambiguous
and that the prior conduct of states in relation to the question is at
best equally uncertain.""
Ultimately, the Court's conclusion with respect to the status of
Nicaragua's declaration is convincing only if one accepts the signifi-
cance it gives to the distinction between "validity" and "effectiveness"
of pre-1946 declarations. The fact that Nicaragua's "acceptance" of the
present Court's compulsory jurisdiction is formally irregular3 5 was not
compelling to the Court. To require a new declaration would have
been, in the Court's view, unreasonable under the circumstances of the
case.13 6 The attitude of the Court in this case towards the requisite
formalities of acceptance of jurisdiction appears to be consistent with
any judicial institution in the international community is based upon consent of sover-
eign states has never changed, and the role of the Optional Clause can never override
that principle.
134. See, e.g., id. at 410, para. 39. For a discussion of the Arbitral Award case, see
supra note 69; id. at 411-12 paras. 43-44 (discussion of inferences from Nicaragua's past
conduct). But see id. at 459, para. 29 (Ruda, J., sep. op.) (conduct not determinative); id.
at 464-65 (Mosler, J., sep. op.) (arguing that Arbitral Award was decided, as Nicaragua
insisted, on the compromis and not on the Optional Clause declarations). See also id. at
489 (Oda, J., sep. op.): "The Court thus appears to take Nicaragua's assertion at face
value and evades considering whether Nicaragua's conduct in [the Arbitral Award] case
would really constitute acquiescence in the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."
For a useful analysis of the Arbitral Award case in the present context, see id. at
528-31 (Ago, J., sep. op.).
135. Cf. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 411, para. 44 (explaining United
States argument as to lack of requisite formalities).
136. See id. at 412-13, paras. 46-47:
[I]f the Court were to object that Nicaragua ought to have a declaration
under Article 36, paragraph 2, it would be penalizing Nicaragua for having at-
tached undue weight to the information given on that point by the Court and
the Secretary General of the United Nations and, in sum, having ... regarded
them as more reliable than they really were.
The Court ... recognizes that, so far as the accomplishment of the formal-
ity of depositing an optional declaration is concerned, Nicaragua was placed in
an exceptional position, since the international organs empowered to handle
such declarations declared that the formality in question had been accomplished
by Nicaragua.
Cf. supra note 111. But see Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 462 (Mosler, J., sep.
op.):
The Declaration of 1929 was a legal instrument, the effect of which de-
pended on a condition precedent, namely the deposit of the instrument of ratifi-
cation of the Protocol of 1920. So long as this act had not been performed the
Declaration remained without legal effect. To qualify it as certainly valid, but
not binding, seems to me a misconstruction of a legal act which was subject to a
suspensive condition.
Accord id. at 475-77 (Oda, J., sep. op.).
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its longstanding jurisprudence of elevating substance over form.'"7 The
Court accordingly found that the continuing "validity" of the Nicara-
guan declaration was sufficient to constitute a binding "intent to recog-
nize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute."
''
Having resolved the difficult issue of the status of Nicaragua's dec-
laration, the Court was still faced with the question of whether there
existed the mutual consent necessary to give it jurisdiction. This ques-
tion required the Court to determine the extent to which the United
States declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction was coextensive
with the Nicaragua declaration. 139 The Court, therefore, turned to an
analysis of the United States declaration.
For the most part, the arguments of the United States replicated
its earlier arguments at the provisional measures stage of the proceed-
ings. The Court's analysis offers answers to the characterization
problems raised by the 1984 declaration. Nicaragua argued that, if the
1984 declaration was a modification, it was invalid (under treaty law
principles), since no right of unilateral modification had been expressly
137. Cf., e.g., Corfu Channel 1947-48 I.C.J. at 28-29 (no formal limits on mutual con-
sent); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 39 ("no rule of international law...
might preclude a joint communiqub from constituting an international agreement to sub-
mit a dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement"); Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. 253 (form
not controlling on question of binding character of unilateral declaration); Temple of
Preah Vihear, 1961 I.C.J. at 31 (formal irregularities in proceedings not determinative).
But see Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 4 (Oda, J., sep. op.):
[Elven supposing that Nicaragua's intention was constant and demonstrable
beyond all doubt, I cannot accept the proposition that intention outweighed the
defect because of the formal character of the latter . . . . [RIatification of the
Protocol was a stringent requirement without whose fulfillment the Permanent
Court could have no jurisdiction over Nicaragua.
Id.
See also id. at 519 (Ago, J., sep. op.) (ratification note mere formality).
138. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 412-13, para. 47. The Court rejected
United States arguments to the effect that Nicaragua was estopped from relying on the
Optional Clause because of its behavior vis-a-vis the United States which, it was con-
tended, suggested an intent not to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
See, e.g., id. at 413-14, paras. 48-50. The Court has consistently tended to disfavor estop-
pel arguments, see e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Judgment of Feb. 20), and in the present case it rejected the argument
on factual grounds. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 414-15, para. 51.
139. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 36, para. 2. Cf., e.g., Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 23 (jurisdic-
tion only to extent that two declarations coincide in conferring it); Certain Norwegian
Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 23 (Judgment of July 6); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952
I.C.J. at 103. See generally I. SHIHATA, supra note 21, at 147-50.
140. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
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reserved in the 1946 declaration.'" In the alternative, if the 1984 decla-
ration was a partial termination of the 1946 declaration, then it was
ineffective until the expiration of the six-month notice period of the
original declaration.
42
The United States responded that the 1984 declaration was a
"modification." Further, since Optional Clause declarations were sui
generis and unlike treaties, it would be inappropriate to extend rules of
treaty law to these declarations in deciding whether a unilateral modi-
fication would be effective."" The United States rejected the character-
ization of the 1984 declaration as a "termination" subject to the six-
month notice period.1 4 4
The Court proceeded to resolve both characterization problems
which had been raised at the provisional measures stage. 145 It first dis-
solved the "modification"/"termination" dispute as irrelevant to the
underlying issues raised by the case:
The argument between the Parties as to whether the 1984 noti-
fication should be characterized as a modification or as a termi-
nation of the 1946 Declaration appears in fact to be without
consequence for the purpose of this Judgment. The truth is
that it is intended to secure a partial and temporary termina-
141. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 404, para. 52. Cf. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 39: "A treaty may be amended by agreement
between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II apply to such an agreement except in
so far as the treaty may otherwise provide."
142. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 416, para. 54.
143. See id. at 415-16, para. 53. Cf. id. at 546, (Jennings, J., concurring):
[T]he discussion in the oral proceedings of whether or not the legal position
of declarations under the Optional Clause is, or is not, governed by the law of
treaties, I found not entirely helpful and in any event inconclusive. The fact of
the matter must surely be that the Optional Clause regime is sui generis. Doubt-
less some parts of the law of treaties may be applied by useful analogy; but so
may the law governing unilateral declarations; and so, most certainly, may the
law deriving from the practice of States in respect of such declarations.
144. Id. at 416, para. 55. The United States also argued that, even assuming the six-
month notice period was generally applicable to the "modification," the 1984 declaration
was still immediately applicable vis-A-vis Nicaragua by operation of reciprocity, since the
Nicaraguan declaration was immediately terminable without notice. Id. at 416-17, para.
55. Nicaragua took the view that its own declaration was not immediately terminable,
being governed by treaty law principles which would require notice of termination in the
absence of express provisions to the contrary. Id. at 417, para. 56. Cf. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 54. The Court cut through this subsidiary line
of argument by reaffirming a principle enunciated in an earlier case, in which it had
rejected a similar argument made by the United States. See Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at
23.
145. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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tion . . . . Counsel for the United States during the hearings
claimed that the notification was equally valid against Nicara-
gua whether it was regarded as a "modification" or as a "termi-
nation" of the [1946] Declaration.140
To the contrary, the key issue at this stage involved the other
characterization problem, whether Optional Clause declarations should
be treated like treaties in analyzing the effectiveness of any purported
modification or termination. The Court's judgment in the Nuclear
Tests cases 4 7 had already suggested that unilateral "declarations" cre-
ated legal (i.e., treaty-like) obligations, 48 though the "declaration"
there had not been one made under the Optional Clause. Despite some
contrary authority directly on this issue,'4 9 the Court chose to extend
the reasoning of the Nuclear Tests cases in this regard to the present
case:
Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court are faculative, unilateral engagements, that States
are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the dec-
laration a State is equally free either to do so unconditionally
and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with
conditions or reservations. . . . However, the unilateral nature
of declarations does not signify that the State making the dec-
laration is free to amend the scope and contents of its solemn
commitments as it pleases. In the Nuclear Tests cases the
Court expressed its position on this point very clearly . .. .50
Indeed, the Court goes so far as to conclude that Optional Clause dec-
larations "establish a series of bilateral engagements with other States
accepting the same obligation . . . in which the conditions, reserva-
tions and time-limit clauses are taken into consideration."'15 1 The
146. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 417, para. 58. See id. at 617, para. 92
(Schwebel, J., dissenting) (accord with Court's disposition of characterization problem).
See also id. at 546 (Jennings, J., sep. op.): "I do not think one need spend much time on
the somewhat theoretical question whether the [1984 declaration] amounts to a modifica-
tion or a substitution of the 1946 Declaration. The major problems of principle would
apply to either." Id.
147. See supra note 27.
148. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 83.
150. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 418, para. 59. Cf. id. at 549 (Jennings, J.,
sep. op.): "[Tihe making of a declaration under the Optional Clause establishes some
sort of relationship with other States that have made declarations; although it is not easy
to say what kind of legal relationship it is. . . . Obviously, .. they do not amount to
treaties or contracts .... "
151. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 418, para. 60.
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notice period in the 1946 declaration is such an engagement, repre-
senting a "positive undertaking"'152 that is binding on the United
States. 15 - In general, Optional Clause declarations should be treated
"by analogy, according to the law of treaties."'" Such declarations,
therefore, are at least "treaty-like," and, in the absence of express pro-
visions to the contrary, their modification or termination would be re-
quired to comply with legal principles governing treaties, including, in-
ter alia, good faith notice of termination or modification. 155
The Court then considered whether, despite the continuing appli-
cability of the United States 1946 declaration, the third express reser-
vation of that declaration might negate jurisdiction in the present
case.1' Since the United States had not specifically agreed to jurisdic-
tion, was the present dispute one in which "all parties to [a multilat-
eral] treaty affected by the decision" were not parties to the case? The
United States noted that four multilateral conventions were implicated
by the dispute, 5 7 and that other interested states that were parties to
the conventions (i.e., Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador) were not
parties to the case.15 Accordingly, the dispute was excluded from the
application of the 1946 declaration by the "multilateral treaties
reservation."
This argument raised considerable ambiguities in the Court's view.
First, Nicaragua's claims were not limited to violations of these con-
152. Id. at 419, para. 62.
153. Id. at 421, para. 65.
154. Id. at 419-20, para. 63.
155. This conclusion made it unnecessary for the Court to consider Nicaragua's sub-
sidiary argument that the 1984 declaration was ineffective because it was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the treaty power, and hence a violation of internal law which was
"manifest and concerned a rule of United States internal law of fundamental impor-
tance." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 46, para. 1. See
Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 421, para. 66. The invalidity of treaties on the
basis of provisions of internal (municipal) law is a matter of continuing controversy, (see
I. BROWNLE, supra note 129, at 610-11), and one may therefore question whether the
Vienna Convention in fact reflects any customary principle of international law in this
regard. Indeed, even as a matter of United States constitutional law, the question of the
validity vel non of unilateral executive action modifying or abrogating previously con-
tracted treaty commitments is far from settled, let alone "manifest." See, e.g., Panel
Discussion, China: Constitutional Implications of Recognition and Derecognition, 1979
PROc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 137.
156. See supra note 57 for text of reservation (c).
157. These multilateral treaties were: (i) the United Nations Charter; (ii) the O.A.S.
Charter; (iii) the Montevideo Charter on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933; and
(iv) the Havana Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil
Strife, Feb. 20, 1928. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 421.
158. See id. at 422, para. 68. See also id. at 604, para. 70 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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ventions.15" Second, the wording of the multilateral treaty reservation
was by no means clear in its meaning or implications."' 0 Finally, a de-
termination of which states would be "affected by the decision" in this
case necessarily looked to the decision of the Court on the merits. 6 '
Hence, invocation by the United States of the multilateral treaty reser-
vation, given its terms, raised "a question concerning matters of sub-
159. Id. at 418, para. 60. The United States nevertheless argued that all the Nicara-
guan claims were merely restatements or paraphrases of the claims based upon the mul-
tilateral treaties in question. See id. Nicaragua rejected this argument, asserting specifi-
cally that customary international law, particularly that related to the use of force, did
not depend solely upon such conventions. See id. at 423-24, para. 71. The Court deci-
sively endorsed the underlying premise of the Nicaraguan argument:
Nicaragua . . .does not confine those claims only to violations of the four
multilateral conventions . . . .On the contrary, Nicaragua invokes a number of
principles of customary and international law . . . .The Court cannot dismiss
the claims of Nicaragua under [such] principles . . . simply because such princi-
ples have been enshrined in the texts of the conventions relied upon by Nicara-
gua . . . . Principles such as those of the non-use of force, non-intervention, re-
spect for the independence and territorial integrity of States, and freedom of
navigation, continue to be binding as part of customary international law, de-
spite the operation of provisions of conventional law in which they have been
incorporated.
Id. at 424, para. 73. But see id. at 614-16, para. 88 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (Nicaraguan
claims under treaties and customary principles substantially equivalent).
160. See, e.g., id. at 424, para. 72:
The multilateral treaty reservation in the United States Declaration has
some obscure aspects, which have been the subject of comment since its making
in 1946. There are two interpretations of the need for the presence of the parties
to the multilateral treaties concerned in the proceedings before the Court as a
condition for the validity of the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction by the
United States. It is not clear whether what are "affected," according to the terms
of the proviso, are the treaties themselves or the parties to them.
For a useful analysis of the interpretive controversy surrounding this reservation, see id.
at 454-57, 467-69 (Ruda, J., & Mosler, J., sep. op.). See also Briggs, Reservations to the
Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 93 HAGUE
ACAD. REC. DES Couss 307 (1958), Waldock, The Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 244, 275 (1955-56).
In any event, the three non-party states involved had themselves accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court and could therefore join the dispute on the merits. See
Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 425, para. 74.
161. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 425, para. 75. See also id. at 449
(Singh, J., sep. op.):
The key words of the [multilateral treaty] reservation are "affected by the
decision," which deprive the reservation of its preliminary character because at
the present jurisdictional stage it is not possible to come to any conclusion as to
which, if any, of the States parties to a multilateral treaty would be affected by
the decision of the Court.
Id. But see id. at 557 (Jennings, J., sep. op.) (difficulty one of interpretation only); id. at
604-05, paras. 71-72 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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stance relating to the merits of the case,"" 2 not simply the question of
jurisdiction vel non. Consequently, under its revised rules,' the Court
did not treat this objection as possessing "an exclusively preliminary
character"1 4 and did not respond to it definitively at this stage of the
proceedings.
2. FCN Treaty Basis for Jurisdiction
Given the Court's reluctance to resolve this last objection concern-
ing the Optional Clause basis for jurisdiction, it became more impor-
tant for the Court to make a determination on the applicant's nar-
rower, alternative basis for jurisdiction, the provisions of a 1956 Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaty) between the
parties. " Article 24, paragraph 2, of the FCN Treaty provides: "Any
dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of
the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the Parties
agree to settlement by some other pacific means."
A preliminary procedural issue arose, however, because Nicara-
gua's application had not invoked the FCN Treaty as a basis for juris-
diction, contrary to the Court's rules." Nicaragua had attempted in its
162. Id. at 425, para. 76. Cf. id. at 555 (Jennings, J., sep. op.):
Nicaragua has ... made the very important ... counter-argument that its
case . . . is based upon customary law as well as, perhaps as much as, upon
multilateral treaty law. This raises some fundamental questions about the na-
ture of international law, and its sources; which is to say that it is a matter of
substance. I fail to see how this question could be fully considered at the present
stage of proceedings.
163. See I.C.J. Rules of Court, supra note 17, art. 79, para. 7:
7. After hearing the parties, the Court shall give its decision in the form of a
judgment, by which it shall either uphold the objection, reject it, or declare that
the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively
preliminary charcter. If the Court rejects the objection or declares that it does
not possess an exclusively preliminary character, it shall fix time-limits for the
further proceedings.
164. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 425, para. 76. See also id. at 448 (Singh,
J., sep. op.) (multilateral treaty reservation is not "exclusively preliminary"). Cf. id. at
611-12, paras. 79-81 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
165. FCN Treaty, supra note 53. Judge Ago would go so far as to say that the FCN
Treaty basis of jurisdiction was " an independent and not. . .a merely 'complementary'
title of jurisdiction." Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 514 (Ago, J., sep. op.).
166. See I.C.J. Rules of Court, supra note 17, art. 38, para. 2:
The application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which
the jurisdiction of the Court is said to be based; it shall also specify the precise
nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts and grounds
on which the claim is based.
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application to reserve the right to amend it, 167 and invoked that right
to justify the introduction of this alternative basis for jurisdiction at
the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings.16 8 The Court did not view
this variance from its rules to be "a bar to reliance"' 9 on the FCN
Treaty at this stage, so long as reliance thereon was clearly indicated
by the applicant and the result of such reliance did not transform the
character of the dispute before it. 7
0
In addressing the FCN Treaty basis of jurisdiction on its own
terms, the United States first argued that there was no showing of a
"reasonable connection between the Treaty and the claims submitted
to the Court.'' 7 After reviewing several substantive provisions of the
FCN Treaty, 7 2 however, the Court concluded that there was under the
circumstances at least a dispute between the parties over the "inter-
pretation or application" of those provisions sufficient to trigger the
jurisdictional provision of the FCN Treaty. 7 3
The United States also argued that, contrary to the requirements
of that jurisdictional provision, there had been no attempt to adjust
the dispute by diplomacy. '7 The Court rejected this argument, point-
edly relying upon its disposition of similar arguments in the Iran hos-
167. Nicaragua Application, supra note 8, at 16.
168. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 426, paras. 77-78.
169. Id., para. 80.
170. Id. at 426-27, para. 80 (citing Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 25; So-
ciete Commerciale de Belgique (BeIg. v. Greece), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 78, at 173
(Judgment of June 15). The Court found these conditions satisfied in the present case.
See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 427, para. 80. See also id. at 515 (Ago, J.,
sep. op.). In a sense, it may be argued that I.C.J. Rules of Court, art. 38, para. 2, is
intended to ensure adequate notice to respondent and to avoid jurisdictional anomalies
from emerging at a relatively late stage in the case. Cf. Malloy, supra note 3, at 340. In
effect, the Court's decision suggests that the United States was not prejudiced by un-
timely notice under the circumstances. No further interest would be served by requiring
Nicaragua to institute, as it would be entitled in any event to do, fresh proceedings based
on the FCN Treaty. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 428-29, para. 83. But see id.
at 628-29, para. 118 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (failure to invoke FCN Treaty in applica-
tion bars later reliance, citing Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 24-25). See also
U.S. Observations, supra note 96, at 260 (FCN Treaty basis not pleaded in accordance
with rulers; basis not seriously argued).
171. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 427, para. 81. See id. at 630-34, paras.
121-25 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (bilateral commercial treaty bears no relation to claims
alleged in the instant case). See also U.S. Observations, supra note 96, at 260-61.
172. FCN Treaty, supra note 53, arts. I, XIV, XVII, XIX-XX.
173. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 429, para. 83. But see id. at 635-37, para.
128 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (the treaty provision expressly excludes claims of the sort
alleged in the instant case).
174. Id. at 427, para. 81. Indeed, it appears that the terms of the FCN Treaty had
never been invoked or referred to in negotiations between the parties. Id.
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tages case in which the United States had been applicant." 5
3. Admissibility of the Claims
The establishment of these two alternative bases of jurisdiction
did not end the preliminary stage of proceedings in the present case.
The Court then considered arguments by the United States that the
claims raised by Nicaragua were inadmissible before it, despite its ju-
risdiction over the parties. The status and timing of objections to the
admissibility of claims, as opposed to jurisdictional objections, have
been a subject of considerable uncertainty and controversy. 17 Though
it may be argued that questions of admissibility are concerned with the
"merits" of the substantive claim itself,1 7 7 they are of a sufficiently pre-
liminary character that their resolution at an early stage of the pro-
ceedings seems preferable.
For the most part, the five objections of the United States on ad-
missibility of the claims replicate its previous argumentation at the
provisional measures stage.1 78 The first objection, a variation on the
theme of its multilateral treaty reservation argumentT1 7  was that the
case did not include certain states whose interests would be affected by
any decision adjudicating Nicaragua's claim.180 These states were, in
effect, "indispensable parties" whom Nicaragua had failed to bring into
175. See, e.g., id. at 428, para. 83:
[The] dispute is also clearly one which is not "satisfactorily adjusted by di-
plomacy" within the meaning of Article XXVI of the [FCN] Treaty (cf. United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, LC.J. Reports 1980, pp. 26-28,
paras. 50-54). In the view of the Court, it does not necessarily follow that, be-
cause a State has not expressly referred in negotiations with another State to a
particular treaty as having been violated by conduct of that other State, it is
debarred from invoking a compromissory clause in that treaty.
Id. See also id. at 427, para. 81, id. at 515-16 (Ago, J., sep. op.); cf. id. at 445 (Singh, J.,
sep. op.) (requirement of prior diplomatic efforts satisfied). But see id. at 453, paras. 5-8
(Ruda, J., sep. op.) (no evidence of requisite invocation of treaty in negotiations). See
also id. at 473 (Oda., J., sep. op.) (reasons why the Iranian hostage case presented distin-
guishable jurisdictional justifications); id. at 629-30, para. 119 (Schwebel, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing the Iranian hostage case). But see id. at 556 (Jennings, J., sep. op.) (indi-
cated that identical treaty provisions were at issue in the two cases). Accord id. at 516
(Ago, J., sep. op.).
176. Nowhere has this controversy over the status of admissibility objections been
more intense than in South West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6.
177. Cf., e.g., Nottebohm (Liecht. v. Guat.) Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 12 (Judg-
ment of Apr. 6); id. at 28 (Klaestad, J., dissenting); id. at 34 (Read, J., dissenting); South
West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. at 55 (Declaration of Spender).
178. Cf. supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
179. Cf. supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
180. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 430, para. 86.
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the case.
This objection had been specifically raised at the provisional mea-
sures stage.18' While the three states involved had informally commu-
nicated their agreement with the assertion that their interests were im-
plicated,"8 2 none had indicated in those communications any intention
to intervene. 88
The Court has taken a narrow view of the applicability of any con-
cept of "indispensable parties" whose absence would require dismissal
of a case before it. Unlike the formulation of the United States multi-
lateral treaty reservation, which focuses on a state "affected" by the
decision, the indispensable party objection has been recognized by the
Court only "where the legal interests of a State not a party . . . 'would
not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-
matter of the decision.' "s184 In the absence of something like a decision
in rem,'86 non-party states whose legal interests were factually impli-
cated by a decision would, in no technical sense at least, be bound by
the Court's decision. s8 6
The four remaining admissibility objections present different,
though related, aspects of the same institutional concern; namely, that
the Court was not the appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in
light of the broader controversy underlying the case. Thus, the second
objection asserted that the fundamental issue in the case was a charge
of illicit use of force or aggression, a charge which presented a matter
committed to the cognizance of the Security Council.' Similarly, the
third objection argued that the court should not exercise subject mat-
ter jurisdisction in a case involving assertions of the "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence" as permitted member states under
the United Nations Charter.
8 8
The Court noted the essential terms of these two arguments as
181. See Order of May 10, supra note 16, at 185.
182. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 430-31, para. 87.
183. See id. But see supra note 92.
184. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 431, para. 88 (quoting Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., Italy v. U.K.; Italy v. U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32
(Preliminary Question Judgment of June 15)).
185. See, e.g., Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. 19.
186. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 59.
187. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 431. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para.
1 (Security Council charged with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security").
188. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 432. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. As a
factual matter, however, there was a serious question whether there had been an "aymed
attack" by Nicaragua to trigger the provisions of article 51. See Judgment of Nov. 26,
supra note 20, at 433.
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follows: "The United States is thus arguing that the matter was essen-
tially one for the Security Council since it concerned a complaint by
Nicaragua involving the use of force."' 89 In the face of these argu-
ments, it went on to confirm the view it had expressed in the Iran hos-
tages case' 90 and at the provisional measures stage of the present
case.' 9 ' The institutional role of the Court in resolving the legal dis-
putes raised by such charges of aggression and countercharges of col-
lective self-defense is primary and not subordinated in any sense to
political or diplomatic processes. 9 Under the Charter, the Security
Council does not have an exclusive institutional role to play in this
regard, despite its exclusive authority under chapter 7 of the
Charter. '93
Similarly, the Court rejected the fourth objection that, as an insti-
tutional matter, the Cotirt was unable to deal with an ongoing political
conflict such as the present case.194 This objection is the merest rhetor-
ical flourish. What dispute between states reaching this Court is not
fraught with political implications? What cases would have remained
on its general list if this argument were cogent? In fact, this objection
is no more than a recasting of the two previous arguments in a more
impressionistic tone.195 The fact that armed conflict is or may be in-
volved does little to distinguish this case from previous ones involving
issues of the use of force, in which the Court had nevertheless exer-
cised its jurisdiction over the subject matter. 9
189. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 433, para. 93.
190. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 21-
22, paras. 40-41.
191. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
192. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 433, para. 93.
193. See id. at 434, paras. 94-95:
It is clear that the complaint of Nicaragua is not about an ongoing armed
conflict between it and the United States, but one requiring . . .the peaceful
settlement of disputes between the two States. Hence, it is properly brought
before the principle judicial organ of the Organization for peaceful settlement.
It is necessary to emphasize that Article 24 of the Charter of the United
Nations ... does not confer exclusive responsibility upon the Security Council
for the purpose [of maintaining international peace and security].
Id. (emphasis in original).
Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 12, para. 1, which expressly limits the role of the General
Assembly where the Security Council is exercising its functions with respect to any dis-
pute or situation. No such provision expresses any similar demarcation of functions be-
tween the Court and the Council.
194. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 436, para. 99.
195. The United States itself emphasized that this conclusion of its fourth objection
was "merely that in this respect the application of international legal principles is the
responsibility of the organs set up under the Charter." Id.
196. See, e.g., Corfu Channel 1949 I.C.J. 4, 31 (Merits Judgment of Apr. 9); Aerial
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The fifth and final objection to admissibility argued that the appli-
cant should be required to exhaust "established [diplomatic] processes
for the resolution of the conflicts occurring in Central America. 1 9 7 In
light of the United States disinclination to engage in the so-called Con-
tadora Process, " this argument may seem particularly disingenuous.
In any event, this objection, like the previous three, seeks to
subordinate the institutional role of the Court to that of other, political
institutions and processes. Further, as had already been noted at the
provisional measures stage, the Court could not find:
any requirement of prior exhaustion of regional negotiating
processes as a precondition to seising the Court; or that the
existence of the Contadora process constitutes in this case an
obstacle to the examination by the Court of the Nicaraguan
Application and judicial determination in due course of the
submissions of the Parties in the case.' 99
The Court concluded, therefore, by a unanimous vote, that the claims
of Nicaragua were admissible."' 0
CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Court on provisional measures and, most par-
ticularly, on jurisdiction and admissibility, represent a significant man-
ifestation of the Court's credibility and attentiveness to its institu-
tional role in the process of pacific settlement of international disputes.
On their abstract merits, the decisions have much to offer students of
international adjudication on such diverse issues as the precise place of
Incident, 1959 I.C.J. at 142; Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959
I.C.J. 276 (Order of Oct. 7); Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1959 I.C.J.
270 (Order of Sept. 9); id., 1960 I.C.J. 146 (Order of May 30).
The United States argued that cases such as those just cited are distinguishable
from the present case, since any use of force had been completed at the time of the
Court's proceedings. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 435, para. 97. This
counter-argument cannot explain, however, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction in the
case of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, where, embarassingly
enough, the United States initiated the use of armed forces in Iran while the case was
sub judice.
197. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 438, para. 102.
198. See id. at 438, para. 103; cf. supra note 90.
199. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 440-41, para. 108. On the findings at the
provisional measures stage, see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
200. Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 442, para. 113(1). While dissenting from
the two jurisdictional decisions in the judgment, Judge Schwebel joined the Court's deci-
sion rejecting the admissibility objections at this stage of the proceedings. See id. at 1-2,
para. 2. (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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the Court in this process, the legal character and significance of Op-
tional Clause declarations, and the applicability of the transitional pro-
visions of article 36, paragraph 5, of the Court's Statute. Unfortu-
nately, these abstract considerations have now been overshadowed by a
crisis of institutional credibility triggered by the United States re-
sponse to the Court's jurisdictional decision in this case.
On January 18, 1985, almost two months after the decision, the
United States announced its intention to withdraw from any further
proceedings in the case.20 1 The Court nevertheless scheduled time lim-
its for the submission of memorials by applicant and respondent on the
merits, April 30 and May 31, 1985, respectively. 02 In a statement by
the United States Department of State accompanying the announce-
ment of United States withdrawal from the case,20 3 the Department
argued that the proceedings were a "misuse of the Court for political
purposes, "204 an ingenuous utterance by a client in need of counselling.
It repeated the United States contention (already rejected) that the
Court lacked jurisdiction and it insisted upon the legally irrelevant fact
that "the scope of the problem [between Nicaragua and the United
States] is far broader '20 5 than a legal dispute.
Among other things, the statement took the position that the
Court's jurisdictional decision based on the Optional Clause declara-
tions was erroneous. It argued as follows:
The Court chose to ignore the irrefutable evidence that Nicara-
gua itself never accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Allowing Nicaragua to sue where it could not be sued was a
violation of the Court's basic principle of reciprocity, which
necessarily underlies our own consent to the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction. On this pivotal issue in the Nov. 26 deci-
sion-decided by a vote of 11-5-dissenting judges called the
Court's judgment "untenable" and "astonishing" and described
201. See U.S. Plans to Quit World Court Case on Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1985, at Al, col. 6.
202. See World Court To Hear Suit, id., Jan. 25, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
203. U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13. See also U.S. Observations, supra note 96.
204. U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13, at 246. This is a particularly infelicitous re-
mark. Would the United States therefore discredit its own motives in instituting pro-
ceedings against the U.S.S.R. in the case of the Aerial Incident of 7 Nov. 1954 (see supra
note 196), where it was conceded by the then applicant United States that the U.S.S.R.
had not made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court? When
the U.S.S.R. declined to accept the United States "invitation" to enter the case already
initiated by the United States, the case was removed from the list. Id.
205. Id.
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the United States position as "beyond doubt." We agree. 20 s
This argument is far from compelling. The arguments before the
Court as to Nicaraguan acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction were less
a factual matter of adducing evidence-"irrefutable" or other-
wise-than a subtle legal question concerning the effect of article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Court's Statute on the Nicaraguan declaration.
Further, the significance of the eleven to five vote on the issue is not
clear, particularly where one of those "dissenting" was the United
States judge, Judge Schwebel.2 0 7 Shall an observer infer that all non-
unanimous decisions of the Court are inherently suspect? Does this in-
clude the Iran hostages decision, in favor of the then-applicant United
States,208 or the 1962 and 1966 decisions in the South West Africa
cases, each decided by one-vote margins and each contradicting the
other?20 9 Such an interpretation does not bespeak the rule of law.
In any event, the focus of the statement on the eleven to five vote
as "this pivotal issue '210 is inherently and shamelessly misleading for
two reasons. First, from the moment the FCN Treaty basis of jurisdic-
tion entered the case, the Optional Clause basis was no longer "piv-
otal. 2 11 Second, the vote on jurisdiction vel non was not eleven to five,
206. Id. at 247. The statement went on to criticize "itihe haste with which the Court
proceeded to a judgment on these issues .... " Id. at 248. To the contrary, see Judge
Nagendra Singh's separate opinion: "The Court's consideration of all these legal obsta-
cles to its own jurisdiction under the Optional Clause has been both thorough and care-
ful, and I do agree with the Court's finding, but it does represent one way of looking at
the picture and interpreting the legal situation." Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at
444 (Singh, J., sep. op.). But see id. at 472 (Oda, J., sep. op.) ("unduly short time allowed
to Judges in the present case for expounding their separate or dissenting opinions").
207. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 442, para. 113(1)(a).
208. The vote in that case varied from question to question. On the question of
whether Iran had violated international law and whether its responsibility had been en-
gaged, the vote was 13-2 on each (affirmative). On whether Iran must take immediate
measures to address the situation causing the violations, the vote was unanimous (affirm-
ative). On whether Iran was under an obligation to the United States for reparations, the
vote was 12-3 (affirmative). On whether reparations should be arranged between the par-
ties and, failing agreement, by the Court, the vote was 14-1 (affirmative). United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. at 44-45, para. 95. The United
States judge participated in the decision, but no ad hoc judge had been appointed by
Iran under I.C.J. Stat. art. 31, para. 2. See id.
209. See South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (8-7 vote); see also id. 1966 I.C.J. at 6
(Second Phase) (8-7 vote, with the president of the Court casting a tie-breaking vote
under I.C.J. Stat. art. 55, para. 2).
210. U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13.
211. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 444 (Singh, J., sep. op.). "[T]he
jurisdiction of the Court Testing upon the IFCN Treatyl provides a clearer and a firmer
ground than the jurisdiction based on . . .the Optional Clause." Id. See also id. at 461-
62 (Mosler, J., sep. op.) (FCN Treaty sole basis for jurisdiction).
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but fifteen to one, the lone vote against was cast by the United States
judge.2 12 Fourteen judges voted for the FCN Treaty basis of jurisdic-
tion,2 13 and fully fifteen for one or the other of the alternative bases.
In a passage worthy of Lewis Carroll, the United States Statement
concludes: "because of our commitment to the rule of law, we must
declare our firm conviction that the course on which the Court may
now be embarked could do enormous harm to it as an institution and
to the cause of international law.
214
Can the rule of law and the institutional credibility of the Court
possibly be served by an action of a major power announcing its inten-
tion to repudiate fundamental duties imposed upon it by the United
Nations Charter and the Court's Statute?21 The precise issue raised
by the United States repudiation of the Court's decision is neither the
correctness of that decision in the abstract, nor the sensibilities of five
judges who voted against one of two independent bases for that deci-
sion. Clearly, the Court's decision on the Optional Clause basis for ju-
risdiction is a conceptual leap, dependent upon the cogency of the dis-
tinction between the "validity" and the "effectiveness" of P.C.I.J.
Optional Clause declarations.
The question now is whether the rule of law can have any meaning
when the United States so cavalierly and cynically disregards the
Charter obligation "to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." ' This repudiation
overshadows any honest dispute that reasonable persons might have
over the proper disposition of the jurisdictional arguments of the par-
ties to this case.
The dissolution of the rule of law into the inertial force of political
power is particularly distressing when it is set in motion by a state that
has in the past publicly encouraged the enhancement of the Court's
institutional credibility through General Assembly resolution"' and
through municipal legislative resolutions and study.2118 One can only
echo Shakespeare and cry, "0, it is excellent to have a giant's strength;
but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant." 1 9
212. See id. at 442, para. 113(1)(c). See also U.S. Observations, supra note 96, at 249.
213. See Judgment of Nov. 26, supra note 20, at 442, para. 113(1)(b).
214. U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13.
215. See supra note 14.
216. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
217. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3232 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 141, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974); see also Gross, Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 479 (1972).
218. See Sohn, Senate Resolutions Relating to the International Court of Justice, 69
AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1975). See also 16 I.L.M. 187 (1977).
219 W. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act II, Scene 2, lines 107-09.
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